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Underdetermination and the Problem
of Identical Rivals
P. D. Magnusyz

If two theory formulations are merely diﬀerent expressions of the same theory, then any
problem of choosing between them cannot be due to the underdetermination of theories by
data. So one might suspect that we need to be able to tell distinct theories from mere
alternate formulations before we can say anything substantive about underdetermination,
that we need to solve the problem of identical rivals before addressing the problem of
underdetermination. Here I consider two possible solutions: Quine proposes that we call two
theories identical if they are equivalent under a reconstrual of predicates, but this would
mishandle important cases. Another proposal is to defer to the particular judgements of
actual scientists. Consideration of an historical episode—the alleged equivalence of wave
and matrix mechanics—shows that this second proposal also fails. Nevertheless, I suggest,
the original suspicion is wrong; there are ways to enquire into underdetermination without
having solved the problem of identical rivals.

1. Introduction. Naturally, underdetermination can only arise between two
or more rival theories. Underdetermination arguments diﬀer as to how the
rivals are ﬁlled in; some provide speciﬁc examples, some provide algorithmically generated rivals, and others invoke the promise of some as yet
unappreciated rival. Regardless, they must provide some viable option
besides endorsing one particular theory.
This precondition for underdetermination is simple enough to specify
formally, but more diﬃcult to apply. Take a simple example of two atomic
theories. The ﬁrst is the usual theory according to which ‘electrons’ are
negatively-charged particles at the periphery of atoms and ‘protons’ are
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positively-charged particles in the core of atoms. The other maintains,
contrarily, that ‘electrons’ are positively-charged particles in the core of
atoms and that ‘protons’ are negatively-charged particles at the periphery
of atoms. Suppose further that the latter theory attributes every feature to
the ‘electron’ that the former attributes to the ‘proton’ and vice versa. The
latter theory includes the claim, for instance, that the ‘electron’ has the
same mass as the ‘neutron.’ How do these two fare as rivals?
It is tempting to say that these are not even distinct theories. The
Russian or French translations of our usual atomic theory are nevertheless
the same theory as the ﬁrst theory we are considering. So, too, we might
insist that the second theory is just another formulation of the ﬁrst—not in
Russian or French, but in its own obscurantist argot. If the two were merely
translations of one another, then we wouldn’t have distinct theories and a
fortiori we would not have rival theories. If this were so, it would make no
sense to ask whether the choice between the two was underdetermined; the
answer would be trivially negative. If they were really distinct, however,
then the choice between them is plausibly underdetermined. So, identifying underdetermination seems to turn on telling whether two theories are
merely notational variants. 1
Put the worry this way: we can’t reasonably say whether the choice
between two rival theories is underdetermined if the two putative rivals
might only be rival formulations of one theory. Without criteria of theory
identity and non-identity, talk of underdetermination is premature. Identifying when putative rivals are merely alternative formulations of the same
theory is not an easy thing. If we give it the somewhat paradoxical label the
problem of identical rivals, then the worry is that resolving the problem of
identical rivals is a necessary condition for a serious discussion of underdetermination.
2. Quine’s Solution. This worry motivates Quine, who considers cases
like this electron-proton inversion and suggests, just as I have, that they be
treated as two formulations of one theory (1975, 319–320). He generalizes
from these cases and proposes that ‘‘two formulations express the same
theory if they are empirically equivalent and there is a reconstrual of
predicates that transforms the one theory into a logical equivalent of the
other’’ (1975, 320). 2 A reconstrual of predicates is a mapping from the
1. Horwich (1982) considers such cases and claims on grounds of common usage that
theories like the second are false. Like the present suggestion, this avoids underdetermination
between alleged rivals just when we have a way to tell that alleged rivals are notational
variants.
2. Sklar (1985) worries that intertranslatability criteria like Quine’s prove spurious—that
they amount to nothing over and above empirical equivalence—but I will presume for the
sake of argument that they add something.
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predicates of one language onto the open formulae of the other, such that
each n-place predicate is mapped onto a formula with n free variables. In
our example, the reconstrual is straightforward: map the predicate electron
onto the sentence ‘x is a proton’ and vice versa.
Quine goes on to consider ‘‘a less trivial case,’’ one which he attributes
to Poincaré—more on Poincaré in a moment. The example involves two
cosmologies: ‘‘Here we have one formulation of cosmology that represents
space as inﬁnite, and another formulation that represents space as ﬁnite but
depicts all objects shrinking in proportion as they move away from the
center.’’ Quine insists that these two cosmologies are alternative formulations of the same theory just as our two ‘atomic theories’ were. He does not
specify how this is so, but instead asserts that the reconstrual, although
‘‘less simple,’’ ‘‘presents no serious challenge’’ (1975, 322). Quine leaves
this as an exercise for the reader, but the reader may well be puzzled.
There is a serious—perhaps insurmountable—challenge which suggests
that Quine’s claim about these two cosmologies is simply false. The latter
cosmology, we may expect, has a predicate ‘Point x is the center of the
universe’ which is satisﬁed by exactly one point. How are we to reconstrue
this in the idiom the ﬁrst cosmology, an idiom in which no point enjoys
such a unique status? If there is no such reconstrual, then the two
cosmologies are distinct theories even by Quine’s own criterion. 3
Although Quine’s example misﬁres, we can easily provide one more
suited to his purposes. Let two cosmologies be given in this way:
C1 Spacetime has some geometry G, and everything in spacetime
follows such-and-so inertial trajectories.
C2 Spacetime has some alternate geometry G*, and universal forces act
on everything in spacetime such that all trajectories conform to C1.
Here we may have one cosmology that represents the curved spacetime
of general relativity and another that represents a ﬂat spacetime plus
universal forces. It looks as if C1 and C2 are identical on Quine’s criterion.
We can take any claim about geometry in C1 and map it onto a claim about
physical geometry in C2, and so on. Of course, this rivalry provides the
basis for Reichenbach’s argument that geometry is underdetermined by
physical theory (1951, ch. 8; 1958). Several authors, presuming the
cosmologies to be distinct, have dared to argue that one is better
conﬁrmed that the other! 4 We cannot even take them seriously if the
cosmologies are not rival theories. Usefulness might distinguish one
3. The fact that no observer in the second cosmology could determine which point satisﬁes
this predicate is irrelevant. Saying the two theories are identical is stronger than saying that
they practically indistinguishable.
4. For instance, Glymour (1980, ch. 9) and Grünbaum (1960).
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formulation from another, but confirmation will not. Thus, it seems that
consequences of Quine’s identity criterion are altogether too strong. 5
Quine does not say where Poincaré oﬀers his example, but Poincaré
surely does oﬀer cases like it. He writes, for instance, of
two universes which are the image one of the other. With each object P
in the universe A, there corresponds, in the universe B, an object P1
which is its image. The co-ordinates of this image P1 are determinate
functions of the object P; moreover, these functions may be of any
kind whatever. . . . ([1908] 1952, 98)
Poincaré maintains not that the claim ‘We are in universe A’ and the claim
‘We are in universe B’ are the same claim, formulated one in the language
of A and the other in the language of B; rather, he says that ‘‘these two
universes will be indistinguishable’’ ([1908] 1952, 98). He sees this as
grounds for refusing to make any claims about absolute space whatsoever.
Thus, where Poincaré insists that the choice of a theory about absolute
geometry is underdetermined, Quine insists that it cannot be underdetermined because all the empirically adequate ones would—on final
analysis—prove to be merely formulations of one theory.
3. The Naturalist Rejoinder. Quine’s criterion would allow scientists to
dispose of the electron-proton inversion case, but they are unlikely to take
it seriously without Quine’s help. Since scientists can dismiss that case
without a formal justiﬁcation, we might look to scientists and to the
scientiﬁc community to determine which formulations represent distinct
theories. This follows the advice of Larry Laudan and Jarrett Leplin, who
counsel a policy of ‘‘deference to scientiﬁc judgment as to what constitutes
a theory’’ 6 (1993, 13).
It is one thing to look at scientiﬁc practice and attempt to abstract from
it principles by which to guide our enquiry. We might use insights gleaned
from the bulk of science to shed light on some particular part of it. The
proposal here is another thing entirely: that we should take our cue from
particular scientiﬁc judgments. If we defer to science on each particular,
we would not be able to dissent from any scientiﬁc judgement. We could
adduce no normative principle besides ‘Follow the scientiﬁc community in
all things’—a principle trivially followed by the scientiﬁc community even
5. Similar conclusions are drawn by Mühlhölzer, who concludes that ‘‘Quine’s criterion . . .
blurs important distinctions . . .’’ (1994, 123).
6. Laudan and Leplin make this suggestion as a way to determine which rival theories are
serious rivals, so it may not be fair to attribute its consequences to them when it is applied to
theory identity. Nevertheless, looking to the scientiﬁc community to resolve disputes about
theory identity is a plausible naturalist move.
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where it stumbles or goes astray. If scepticism is the Scylla of
epistemology, then quietism is its Charybdis. ‘Believe what you believe’
is of as little practical value to a deliberating agent as ‘Believe nothing.’
The suggestion may be seen as something more than quietism insofar as
it recommends for philosophers to defer to scientists. Advice to defer to
experts may be of use to deliberating agents who are not themselves
experts. This might be a blow to the egos of philosophers but perhaps it
would be all well and good, if only scientists had expertise on the identity
of theories beyond the ken of philosophers. However, scientists don’t
centrally concern themselves with criteria of identity or meaning. They
employ and criticize particular theories, but they do not by and large pay
attention to theory as such. Moreover, there have been theories in the
history of science which at one time were considered rivals but which
came to be seen as alternate formulations of a single theory. The lesson of
such episodes is that deference to scientiﬁc judgment on these matters
might lead us astray.
4. The Case of Matrix and Wave Mechanics. This point is best pressed
home by considering a speciﬁc example. In 1926, two formulations of
quantum mechanics were on oﬀer: matrix mechanics which had been
introduced by Werner Heisenberg and others the year before and wave
mechanics formulated by Erwin Schrödinger. Schrödinger and Carl Eckart
independently published results which claimed to show that matrix
mechanics and wave mechanics were equivalent. Thus, matrix and wave
mechanics were at most rival formulations of one common theory. It is
usual to say both that the two were equivalent and that the papers by
Schrödinger and Eckart provided valid reason for thinking so. A typical
physics textbook claims that Schrödinger ‘‘showed that the matrix and
wave mechanics formulations give identical results and diﬀer only in their
mathematical form’’ (Thornton and Rex 1993, 208). Philosophers make
similar claims, saying, for example, ‘‘The early formulations of the theory,
by Heisenberg and Schrödinger, were, respectively, in terms of sequences
and of functions; subsequently Schrödinger established that . . . the two
formulations were equivalent.’’ So, the two are treated by almost everyone
as being merely ‘‘formulations of the [singular] theory’’ (Hughes 1989,
45). Such claims are so widespread as to count as common knowledge. 7
The connection with underdetermination has not gone unnoticed: Philip
Kitcher uses the notion that the two are merely rival formulations to deny
that the choice between them was underdetermined (2001a, 195; 2001b,

7. Muller, who dubs the view the Equivalence Myth, provides a no doubt incomplete list of
almost ﬁfty sources that promulgate it (1997, 37).
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35). 8 Yet, as Norwood Russell Hanson remarked, ‘‘the unguarded statement that Wave and Matrix Mechanics are equivalent physical theories is
so unsound, historically and even conceptually, that a re-examination of
the issue might still be tolerable’’ (1963, 113).
F.A. Muller employs the structural view of theories in such a reexamination and, like Hanson, concludes that Schrödinger’s 1926 paper did not
show what it is so often taken to show. 9 Even the usual account concedes
that matrix and wave mechanics were associated with diﬀerent ontologies—the former quite deliberately involved no commitment to unobserved states of particles, whereas the latter treated particles as quivering
puddings of mass and charge. 10 This diﬀerence in ontology is not merely a
matter of labels. Because waves are distributed in space, wave mechanics
has the resources to express spatial relations. Apply this to a concrete case
and consider a charged particle detector that occupies some speciﬁed
region of space and an electron that turns up in it. Since waves disperse
over time, wave mechanics predicts that the detector should not detect the
entire charge of the electron. Only part of the electron wave will be in the
detector, and only that part would be detected. Since there is no straightforward way to represent spatial coordinates in matrix mechanics, contrawise, matrix mechanics does not yield this prediction. This prediction
might have been tested, allowing the opportunity to distinguish empirically
between wave and matrix mechanics (Muller 1997, 227). Rather than
being mere window dressing, the diﬀering ontologies reﬂect diﬀerences in
expressive power and empirical upshot. With the further notion of wave
collapse—the supposition that the wave becomes localized when it is
observed—wave mechanics would not yield the critical prediction. Be that
as it may, the notion of wave collapse had not been introduced at the time
of Schrödinger’s alleged equivalence proof. 11
This historical episode holds an important telling point against the
naturalist criterion for theory identity. Scientists can believe that two
theories are merely rival formulations of one theory even when they have
insuﬃcient reason for doing so. This may be self-fulﬁlling; if further
development of each rival is directed toward making the supposed identity
more explicit, then successors of the two rivals may be formulations of

8. This connection is also made by Wilson (1980, 217) and Sklar (1985).
9. Muller cites Hanson as someone who ‘‘denies the equivalence, but unfortunately for all
the wrong reasons’’ (1997, 37 fn. 4). This is probably unfair, but I make no attempt here to
resuscitate Hanson’s reasoning.
10. In Muller’s phrase, ‘‘tiny jelly-like lumps of vibrating charged matter’’ (1997, 229).
11. One may say that Schrödinger’s theory of waves qua matter waves was simply falsiﬁed
by subsequent developments.
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some one theory even if the initial rivals were not. Surely, it is also possible
for two rivals to be rival formulations of one theory even though scientists
do not know that to be the case.
5. Taking Stock. Muller’s work using the structural conception of theories
provides an example of how speciﬁc questions of theory equivalence may
be resolved, so one might think that it shows how the problem of identical
rivals may be solved in general. This structural conception (called variously the semantic or model-theoretic conception) requires specifying the
theory as a class of set-theoretical structures (or models). Critics have
charged that this formal requirement elides important features of scientiﬁc
theories (Cartwright 1983, 159–161), and even advocates of the semantic
conception argue for treating theories as ‘models’ in an informal, nonmathematical sense. Giere, for instance, argues for the ‘‘model-theoretic
view’’ and allows models that are ‘‘prototypes or exemplars’’ (1994, 283,
fn. 3). Where models are not or cannot be speciﬁed set-theoretically,
Muller’s approach can ﬁnd no purchase. Thus relying on the structural
conception here would not provide a general solution and would replace
one dispute with another.
Without attempting to decide between the structural view and its many
rivals, 12 I remind the reader that theories are products of human craftsmanship. Not only do theories have histories, but theory itself has a history.
Whatever it is now, it came to be that way and may come to be diﬀerent.
Philosophers can accompany an account of theory with a call to represent
theories in that way, 13 but theory as scientists meet it is red in tooth and
claw. Closer examination of episodes like the dissolving rivalry between
wave and matrix mechanics might allow us to adduce principles of theory
identity and non-identity—principles informed by and applicable in
practice. Let me simply observe that questions of theory identity are
unresolved and that their resolution (if it is possible at all) would demand
considerable further work.
I concluded Section 1 with the worry that solving the problem of
identical rivals was a precondition for talking seriously about underdetermination. Absent such a solution, should underdetermination be
taboo? I think not. Any two theory formulations which a scientist takes
to be distinct can be considered as rivals for the purpose of asking if the
choice between them is underdetermined. This enquiry might be fruitful in
one of two ways. First, if the choice between rivals can be shown not to be
12. Formal work has also been done on the identity conditions of theories within state-space
semantics (Churchland 1998), but one is hard-pressed to see how the theories considered
above could be reconstrued as patterns of activations in neural networks.
13. As Suppes (1968) does.
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underdetermined, then the theories must be distinct. Even if we don’t know
necessary and suﬃcient conditions for theory identity, we do know some
suﬃcient conditions for non-identity—empirical inequivalence, for one.
Second, if the alleged underdetermination can be shown to have no serious
consequences, then nothing turns on whether the rivals are actually
distinct. Even if the electron-proton inversion case involved distinct
theories in some sense, it would be hard to get excited about the underdetermination between them.
It is possible, of course, that there will be some cases of putative underdetermination with considerable consequences. We might then be pushed
to consider whether the apparent underdetermination obtains between
distinct theories—pushed, that is, to consider the problem of identical
rivals. Whether that will happen is not something we can know a priori,
however, so the worry should not paralyze us.
I do not deny that a criterion of theory identity would be a nice thing to
have. Problems of theory individuation, of which the problem of identical
rivals is a special case, are interesting in their own right. Resolving them,
however, can only come as the result of a careful examination of the
history of science—an examination which must be left for some other
time. I draw the modest conclusion that this open question need not turn us
back from considering underdetermination.
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